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GOVERNMENTAL SOVEREIGNTY ACTIONS
AnnWoolhandler*
InArizona v. United States,1 thefederalgovernmentsuedtoenjoinenforcementof
Arizonas immigration laws on preemption grounds.2 AndinVirginia exrel. Cuccinelli
v. Sebelius,3 thestateattorneygeneralarguedthatthestatehadstandingtochalengethe
AffordableCareActbecauseitwouldunconstitutionalypreemptastatelawdisalow-
inghealthinsurancemandates.4 Ineachcase, thegovernmentplaintiffassertedthatit
hadthepowertoregulateaparticularsubjecttotheexclusionof, orinadditionto, the
governmentdefendant. Thesedisputesmaybecharacterizedasseekingtovindicate
sovereigntyinterests.
Inapreviousarticle, MichaelColinsandI arguedthatthecourtsshouldbe
reluctanttocountenancesuchgovernment-initiatedsuits.5 Inadditiontolookingtothe
Courts traditional treatment of these cases as nonjusticiable, we arguedas had
AlexanderBickel6that disallowing intergovernmental suits to vindicate sovereignty
* WiliamMinorLileProfessorofLaw, UniversityofVirginia. ThankstoMichaelColins,
John Harrison, Jonathan Nash, Caleb Nelson, and George Rutherglen. John Harrisons views on
sourcesofimpliedactionswereextremelyhelpful.
1 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
2 Id. at2498;see also UnitedStatesv. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d1282 (N.D. Ala. 2011)
(entertaining a federal preemption challenge to Alabamas immigration laws).
3 702 F. Supp. 2d598 (E.D. Va. 2010).
4 Id. at 601 (indicating that the plaintiff alleged that the statute was beyond Congresss
commercepowerandinterferedwithstatelaw, andentertainingtheaction), revd, 656 F.3d
253 (4thCir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 59 (2012).
5 AnnWoolhandler& MichaelG. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA.L.REV. 387, 396 (1995)
(arguing, interalia, thatsuchsuitsshouldgenerally require legally protected interestssuch
asaninjurylikethatwhichwouldallow aprivatepartytosue, orstatutoryauthorization);
see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 53637 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(arguingthatrelaxingthestandingrequirementsforstatesisunwarranted);AlexanderBickel,
The VotingRights Cases, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 79, 8590 (1967) (criticizing the Courts
recognition of the states standing in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966));
RonaldA. Cass, Massachusettsv. EPA: The Inconvenient Truth About Precedent, 93 VA. L.
REV. IN BRIEF 75, 7879 (2007) (arguing against easing standing requirements for states);
StephenI. Vladeck, States Rights and State Standing, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 845, 84849
(2012) (arguingthatCuccinellididnotpresentacasewherethestatehadaninterestseparate
from itscitizensthatwouldallow forsuit);cf. KevinC. Walsh, The Ghost That Slayed the
Mandate, 64 STAN. L. REV. 57, 6566 (2012) (questioning whether Cuccinelli had a cause
ofactiontochallengetheAffordableCareAct, butassumingthattheUnitedStateshadan
actionagainstArizona).
6 Bickel, supra note5, at89 (allowingstatesuitstocontesttheconstitutionalityof
federal statutes would be a fundamental denial of the principle that the federal government
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interestsreinforced thefederalism principlethatstateand federalgovernments
shouldactprimarilyonthepeopleratherthanoneachother.7 Wealsoarguedthat
preferenceforsuitsbetweenindividualsandgovernmentenhancedthestatusof
individuals as rights-holders againstgovernment, particularly with respectto
structuralclaims.8 Discouragingsovereignty-basedclaimswouldalsohelptoavoid
abstractjudicialdeterminationsofthevalidityofgovernmentalaction.9
Commentatorshavecriticizedrestrictiveviewsofgovernmentstanding, including
ours, asinsufficientlytakingintoaccountthatdualfederalism hasbeendisplaced
byoverlappingfederalism.10 Theyarguethatinsovereignty-basedsuits, thegovern-
mentisseekingtovindicateitsowninterests,11 andthatthegovernmentshouldeven
isasovereigncoexistinginthesameterritorywiththestatesandacting, notthroughthem,
like some international organization, but directly upon the citizenry).
7 Woolhandler& Collins, supra note5, at439.
8 Id. at 43940, 50304; see also Vladeck, supra note 5, at 87374 (arguing that ex-
pandingstatestandingwouldcrowdoutindividualsuits);cf. TylerWelti, Note, Massachusetts
v. EPAs Regulatory Interest Theory: A Victory for the Climate, Not Public Law Plaintiffs,
94 VA. L.REV. 1751, 1775 (2008) (arguingthattheCourtinMassachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.
497 (2007), based standing on the states regulatory interest in the federal governments failure
toactinanareawhereithadpreemptedstatelaw, andthatsuchstandingmaycreatearegime
in which state attorneys general have monopoly power over public law adjudication.).
9 See Woolhandler& Collins, supra note5, at440;see also Bickel, supra note5, at90
(arguingthatallowingstatestosuethefederalgovernmentwouldaggrandizethejudicial
function, and bringabstractdisputesbeforetheCourt);Vladeck, supra note5, at872
(arguingthatexpandingstatestandingriskedconvertingfederalcourtsintocouncilsof
revision);cf. Woolhandler& Collins, supra note 5, at 44243 (arguing that expansion of the
notionofacasedidnotsuggestbroadgovernmentalstanding).
10 See SethDavis, Implied Public Rights of Action, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8, 5153
(2014) (arguingthatseparatespheresnolongeraccuratelydescribesgovernmentandthat
governmentalstandingrulesshouldbemodifiedaccordingly);cf. KatherineMimsCrocker,
Note, SecuringSovereign State Standing, 97 VA. L. REV. 2051 (2011) (arguingagainsta
popularsovereigntistargumentthatfailstorecognizetheseparateinterestofthestatesin
vindicatingtheirrightstogovern). See generally RoderickM. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption:
HowFederalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4, 17
(2007) (arguing that dual federalism notions are outdated, but favoring courts use of a clear-
statementanti-preemptionruleofconstruction, becausestateregulationwillencourage
Congresstobeamorepoliticallyaccountableregulator).
11 See DavidBarron, Why (and When)Cities Have a Stake in Enforcingthe Constitution,
115 YALE L.J. 2218, 2242 (2006) (inarguingforenhancedstandingofcitiestoconteststate
laws in state and federal courts, suggesting that a governments interests in maintaining its
owncapacitytoserveasaforum fordemocraticcontestationandpolicyshouldbepreferred
totheroleofthegovernmentasaguardianoftherightsofitsowncitizens);id. at2249
(defendingsuchstandingwhenitistopreservelocalpolicymakingratherthantryingfora
uniform solution);Crocker, supra note10, at2068 (statingthatsovereigntyinterestsare
independent, whilequasi-sovereigninterestsarederivative, suchthatstatesshouldgenerally
beallowedtoassertsovereigntyinterestsbutnotparens patriae interests);KennethT.
Cuccinelli, II etal., State Sovereign Standing:Often Overlooked, But Not Forgotten, 64
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betreatedasthebestplaintifftopursuestructuralclaims.12 Theyalsoclaim thatrestric-
tiveviewsofgovernmentstandingreflecttoonarrowaviewofcausesofaction, failing
totakeintoaccounttheregulatoryaim ofenforcingfederallaw, asdistinguishedfrom
theaim ofvindicatingindividualimmunitiesandrights.13 ThisArticletakesupthe
questionofgovernmentsuitstovindicatesovereigntyinterestsinlightofsucceeding
scholarshipandcases.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Governmental Standingand Implied Causes of Action
IssuesofgovernmentalabilitytoinitiatesuittypicallyarisewhenCongresshas
notclearlyauthorizedsuitsbythestateorfederalgovernmentasplaintiffinthe
federalcourts. Commentatorshaveinterchangeablyaddressedtheissueaseitherone
ofstandingorimpliedcauseofaction,14 aswillthisArticle. Thetermsstandingand
impliedactions, however, requirefurtherdelineation.
STAN. L. REV. 89, 93 (2012) (That the Attorney General of Virginia would bring a suit to
defendthevalidityofaVirginiastatutefrom aclaim offederalpreemptionshouldnothave
been at all surprising.); id. at111 (disclaimingrelianceonparens patriae);Davis, supra
note10, at6, 67 (arguingthereisnoneedtofavorgovernmentactionswhenitisrepresenting
theinterestsofcitizens, butthatcourtsshouldfavorsuchactionswhengovernmentisvindicat-
ing institutional interests such as its claims to intergovernmental immunities and authority
toregulate);JonathanRemyNash, Null Preemption, 85 NOTRE DAMEL.REV.1015, 107374
(2010) (arguingthatstatesshouldbeabletochallengefederalactionthatbothpreemptsstate
law andprovidesnosubstantiveregulation);AmyJ. Wildermuth, Why State Standingin
Massachusettsv. EPA Matters, 27 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 273, 315 (2007) (arguingthat
statesshouldbeabletosuetheUnitedStatestovindicatesovereigntyinterests, andthereby
avoidsomeoftheuncertaintiessurroundingsuitsfortheirquasi-sovereigninterests).
12 See Crocker, supra note 10, at 2085 (arguing that individuals are a grossly inadequate
substitutewhenitcomestoassertingthestructuralconstitutionalprotectionsunderlyingstate
sovereignty); Davis, supra note 10, at 7980 (arguing that governments are the most interested
partiesinstructurallitigation);AzizZ. Huq, Standingfor the Structural Constitution, 99 VA.L.
REV. 1435, 1440, 1465, 1490 (2013) (arguingthatinstitutionallitigantssuchasCongress, the
Executive,andstatesshouldbepreferredtoindividualsforlitigatingstructuralguarantees, given
thelargespillovereffectsonunrepresentedpartiesinindividualstructurallitigation, aswellas
private parties lack of incentives to pursue optimal enforcement).
13 Davis, supra note10, at66 (arguingthatimpliedgovernmentalactionscanservethe
regulatorypurposeofenhancingtheenforcementoffederallaw).
14 See Crocker, supra note 10, at 205254 (treating the problem as one of state standing);
Davis, supra note 10, at 38 (discussing the problem as one of implied rights of action); Huq,
supra note12, at1515 n.321 (indicatingthatheusesstandingandcauseofactioninterchange-
ablyinhisdiscussionofindividualversusinstitutionalconstitutionalchallenges);Walsh, supra
note 5, at 57 (arguing that there was no federal question cause of action for Cuccinellis
challengetotheACA).
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Standingmaybedividedintoconstitutionalandsubconstitutionalcategories. A
lackofconstitutionalstandinggeneralymeansthatCongresscouldnotaccordaclaim
totheparty;thefocusisoftenoninjuryinfact. Bycontrast, alackofsubcon-
stitutionalstandingmeansthattheplaintiffhasnotallegedaharm tothetypeof
interestthatgivesheracauseofactionintheparticularcircumstances, evenifthat
partymightbeableto litigatethatinterestin othercontextsorifCongressso
provided. Mostissuesofgovernment-initiatedsuitsinthefederalcourtscanbe
curedifCongressauthorizestheaction.15 Thus standing as used herein refers to
subconstitutionalstanding. Inthecontextofgovernment-initiatedsuits, thissubcon-
stitutionalstandingquestionisgenerallythesameissueaswhethertheplaintiff
shouldbeaccordedanimpliedaction.
Oneneeds, however, todivideup impliedactionsintothosethataremore
strictly implied and those that are not. The Courts current doctrine as to implied
statutorycausesofactionrequiresthatCongressinfacthavecreatedthecauseof
action, suchthatonemaycharacterizetheactionasstrictlysourcedorimpliedfrom
thestatute. Someimpliedstatutoryactions, however, arelessthanstrictlyprescribed
by statute and one may treat them as sourced in the courts equitable (or possibly
commonlaw) discretion, combinedwiththestatute.16
Similarly, someactionsraisingconstitutionalissuesmaybestrictlyimpliedor
sourcedintheConstitutioninthesensethattheConstitutionrequiresthem. While
onemaydebatewhatfallsintotheconstitutionallyrequiredcategory, itmaybe
enoughtosaythatacauseofactionisconstitutionallynecessaryifCongresscould
notsubstantiallyabrogateit. Whennotstrictlyconstitutionallyimplied, anaction
maybetreatedassourcedintheequitable(orperhapscommonlaw) discretionof
thecourts, combinedwiththeConstitution.
Implied actions, as used herein, does not refer to strictly implied statutory or
constitutionalactions. Governmentpartiesinitiatingnonstatutorysuitsgenerally
lackargumentsthatCongressactuallyintendedtoprescribetheparticularaction, or
thattheConstitutionrequiresit. Theplaintiff, therefore, isoftenappealingtothe
equitablediscretionofthecourttorecognizethecauseofaction. Asdiscussed
below, it should count against the courts use of its discretion to imply an action that
alternativeremediesalreadyexist17remedies that do not press the boundaries of
15 AtleastthatistheassumptioninthisArticle. See, e.g., TaraLeighGrove, Standingas
an Article II Nondelegation Doctrine, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 781, 793 n.36 (2009) (Courts
have doubted the Executive Branchs standing to bring suit only when it lacked express
congressional approval.).
16 Cf. Lexmark Intl v. Static Control Components, 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 (2014)
(indicatingthattheissueofstandingforastatutorycauseofactioniswhetherthelegislature
conferred a cause of action encompassing a particular plaintiffs claim).
17 See, e.g., Gonzaga v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 28990 (2002) (reasoning that Congresss
providingmechanismsfortheagencytoaddressviolationsmilitatedagainstaprivateright
of action); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 48990 (1973) (reasoning that Congress
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executiveandjudicialpower, andthatdonotunderminetheroleofindividualsas
rightsclaimants.
B. Categories of Government Interests
Discussionsofgovernment-initiatedsuitshaveoftenbrokendownthediscus-
sionbasedontheinterestthatthegovernmentreliesoninbringingasuit. A suit
premisedononeoftheinterestsnotedbelow, however, mayoftenvindicateoneof
theotherinterests.
(1) Enforcement interests.18 Generally, legitimategovernmentliti-
gationrequiresstatutoryauthorization,19 andmostgovernmentsuits
toenforcestatutesorregulationsarestatutorilyauthorized.
(2) Interests similar to those of private parties. Whenthegovern-
mentsuestovindicateintereststhatwouldgiveanindividual20 a
lawsuitinsimilarcircumstances, itisgenerallyunnecessarythatthe
legislatureexplicitlyauthorizethegovernmenttosue. Thegovern-
mentinsuchsituations, however, generallyneedsaninjuryinfact.
Commentatorshavereferredtothiscategoryasproprietary, com-
monlaw, orcorporateinterests.21
(3) Parens patriae interests, alsocalledquasisovereignorsubsti-
tuteinterests.22 Insuchcases, thegovernmentsuestovindicatethe
interestsofitscitizens.
intendedthathabeasratherthan§1983 suitswouldbeusedwhenaprisonersoughtrelief
thatquestionedthefactordurationofconfinement).
18 Woolhandler& Collins, supra note5, at410;see also Davis, supra note10, at20
(using a similar category denominated administrative interests).
19 See TaraLeighGrove, StandingOutside of Article III, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1311,
131416 (2014) (indicatingthatfederalinstitutionsneedaffirmativeauthoritytoact, in-
cludingtobringsuit);cf. id. at 15 (discussing that the executive branch has standing to
assert the federal governments interests in the continued enforceability of its laws, and
todefendfederallawsthatitdoesnotdirectlyenforce, underitsinterventionpowersunder
28 U.S.C. §2403);EdwardHartnett, The Standingof the United States:How Criminal
Prosecutions ShowThat StandingDoctrine Is Lookingfor Answers in All the WrongPlaces,
97 MICH. L. REV. 2239, 2251 (1999) (pointingoutthatgovernmentenforcementsuitsneed
notmeetinjuryinfactrequirements).
20 Individual as used herein refers to private parties, including corporations and trade
organizations.
21 See, e.g., Crocker, supra note10, at2053 (referringtoproprietaryinterests);Davis,
supra note 10, at 17 (using the term corporate interests); Woolhandler & Collins, supra
note5, at410 (notingthereisnoparticularproblem withgovernmentstandingwhenthestate
sufferedinjurieslikethoseofindividuals).
22 Crocker, supra note10, at2053 (referring to quasi-sovereign orparens patriae
interests);Davis, supra note10, at22 (referringtosubstituteinterests).
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(4) Sovereignty interests, alsocalledgoverninginterestsandinstitu-
tionalinterests, inwhichthegovernmentsuestovindicateitspower
togovernaparticularsubjectmatter.23
C. Traditional Means for RaisingGovernmental Sovereignty Interests;and
Modern Inroads
TheprimaryfocusofthisArticleisonsovereigntyinterests, thefourthcategory.
But a governments interest in exercising its powerparticularly as a plaintiffcan
normally be tested by the governments exercising its power, particularly through
governmentenforcementactionsinitsowncourts(category(1) above). Ifagovern-
mentbringsanenforcementaction, thedefendantcanarguethattheexerciseofpower
isinvalidforstructuralornonstructuralgrounds. Damagesactionsbythetargetsofgov-
ernmentenforcement, andinjunctiveactionsagainstimminentenforcementmayraise
similarissues, althoughwiththepartiesreversed.24 Theseactionsbetweengovernment
(or its officers) and private parties take traditional formsfor example, governments
claim of power in an enforcement action is met with an individuals argument for
immunity. Inaddition, suitsbetweenprivatepartiesmayraiseissuesofgovernmental
powers, asintortclaimswherethedefendantclaimsfederalpreemption.25
Overtime, theexpansionofinjunctiveanddeclaratorysuits26 hasenhanced
individuals ability to bring actions based on the threatened impacts of illegal
governmentaction.27 TheCourthasnot, however, generallyfavoredgovernment
23 See Crocker, supra note10, at2053;see also id. at2055 (statingthatquasi-sovereign
interestsarerepresentative, whilesovereigninterestsarethosecentraltothecoreofgoverning);
Woolhandler& Colins, supra note 5, at 41011 (callingtheseinterestsgoverninginterests);
Davis, supra note 10, at 18 (using a category of institutional interests that concerns injuries to
political powers and rights). Daviss definition,however,wouldincludeinstanceswherefederal
or state law gives the government or its officials immunity from judicial process, taxation, or
regulation. Id. ThisArticletreatsthosecasesasinvolvinginstanceswherethegovernmentcan
sueonsimilartermsasaprivateparty. See infra notes 4449 and accompanying text.
24 See, e.g., Am. Trucking Assns v. City of L.A., 133 S. Ct. 2096 (2012) (upholding
trucking organizations preemption challenge to city regulations of trucks at the port);
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374 (1992) (upholding the airlines preemption
challengeinfederalcourtaftertheTexasattorneygeneralthreatenedenforcementofstate
consumerregulationswithrespecttofareadvertising);id. at377 (indicatingthatthefederal
government participated as amicus on the airlines side).
25 See DanielJ. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112 MICH.L.REV. 1, 4546 (2013)
(discussingvariouswayspreemptionissuescanarise). See generally CatherineM. Sharkey,
Preemption by Preamble:Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL
L. REV. 227 (2007) [hereinafterSharkey, Preemption by Preamble](discussingproduct
liabilitypreemptionissues, whichfrequentlysurfaceintortactions).
26 ThisArticlereferstotheseasanticipatorysuits.
27 Thesesuitshaveincluded instanceswhereno governmentenforcementaction is
threatened. See, e.g., Crosby v. Natl Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (challenging
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declaratoryactionsagainstcitizenstoobtainjudicialdeterminationsthatgovernment
actionisvalid. TheCourtinFranchise TaxBoard of California v. Construction
Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California28 reasonedthatthestatetaxing
authority, havingavailablemeanstoteststatelawsthroughenforcementactionsin
statecourt, couldnotfileafederaldeclaratoryactiontohaveitstaxcollectionef-
fortsdeemednon-preemptedbyERISA.29 TheCourtthussuggestedthatanticipatory
actionsweregenerallymeanttogiveindividualsanalternativetogovernmentenforce-
ment, nottogivethegovernmentasaplaintiffanadditionalmeanstotestitspowers
againstindividuals.30
Justasagovernmentmaygenerallylackadeclaratoryactiontohaveitslaws
declaredvalidbythefederalcourtsinactionsagainstindividuals, sotoowerethe
stateandfederalgovernmentstraditionallyunabletobringsuitsagainsteachother
todeclaretheirinterestingoverningtotheexclusionoftheother.31 Thus, southern
a state law limiting the states contracting with firms doing business with Burma). There is an
ongoingdebateabouttheextentofthisexpansion, addressedinthebriefsinDouglas v. Indep.
LivingCtr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1211 (2012) (decliningtoreachtheissueofwhether
aSupremacyClauseactionexisted, orwhethertherewasgenerallyananticipatoryactionwhen
noenforcementwasthreatened). Compare Initial Brief: Appellee-Respondent at 2930, 1a-11a,
Douglasv. Indep. LivingCtr. ofS. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012) (Nos. 09-958, 09-1158,
10-23) (includinganappendixlistingpreemptionsuitsallegednottoinvolveenforcement
actions), with Initial Brief: Appellant-Respondent at 4243, Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of
S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012) (Nos. 09-958, 09-1158, 10-283) (characterizingpre-
emptionactionsasfallingprimarilyintocaseswheretheCourtatleastimplicitlyrecognized
anindividualrightorwherepreemptionwaseffectivelydefensive), and ReplyBrief: Appelant-
Petitionerat2932, Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012)
(arguing that the respondents list of cases confirmed the States categorizations).
28 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
29 Id. at 2021 (indicating that federal courts should not entertain suits by the States to
declarethevalidityoftheirregulationsdespite possibly conflicting federal law because
states have a variety of means by which they can enforce their own laws in their own
courts); Walsh, supra note5, at57 (arguingthatFranchise TaxBoard indicatestherewas
no statutory subject matter jurisdiction over Cuccinellis ACA suit).
30 463 U.S. at 2122 (States are notsignificantlyprejudicedbyaninabilitytocometo
federalcourtforadeclaratoryjudgmentinadvanceofapossibleinjunctivesuitbyaperson
subjecttofederalregulation. . . . Thesituationpresented by a States suit for a declaration of the
validityofstatelawissufficientlyremovedfrom thespiritofnecessityandcarefullimitationof
districtcourtjurisdictionthatinformed[two previous declaratory judgment decisions].).
31 See Woolhandler& Collins, supra note 5, at 41319 (discussing cases in which the
Courttreatedinterestsingoverningasnonlitigable);id. at 41516 (indicating that while
boundarycaseswereanexception, theCourtentertainedthesecasesinpartbecausethey
resembledtraditionalpropertyclaims). But cf. Cuccinellietal., supra note 11, at 92 (The
collisionbetweenthestateandfederalschemesalsocreatesanimmediate, actualcontroversy
involving antagonistic assertions of right); id. at94 (arguingthataprincipalpurposeofthe
federalcourtswastoresolvecompetingclaimsofstateandfederalpower);Huq, supra note
12, at 144344 (seeming to assume thatgovernmentalinstitutionscanreadilyraisestructural
constitutionalclaimsinthecourts).
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statesfoundthemselvesunabletochalengethelegalityofReconstructioninGeorgia
v. Stanton.32 Somewhatmorerecently, however, theCourtbeganentertainingsuch
powervs. powersuits, suchaswhenthestateofOregonsuedtheUnitedStates
AttorneyGeneraltoinvalidatecongressionallegislationpurportingtorequirestates
toallow eighteen-year-oldstovoteinstateelections.33 Thecourts, however, have
remainedambivalentaboutsovereignty-basedactions,34 asindicatedbytheFourth
Circuits disallowing the Virginia Atorney Generals chalenge to the Affordable Care
Act.35 InArizona v. United States,36 however, the Supreme Courtwithout address-
ing the governmental standing issuecountenanced the United States effort to have
Arizonas laws declared preempted.37
II. ARGUMENTS ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY-BASED ACTIONS
Asnotedabove, somecommentatorshavewelcomedsuitssuchasthosebrought
byVirginiaandtheUnitedStatestovindicatetheirsovereigntyinterests. Totheargu-
mentthatpreservingthetraditionalformsofsuitpromotesdualsovereignty, theyre-
spondthatimpliedgovernmentsuitsbeterreflecttherealitiesofmodernfederalism.38
Totheargumentthattraditionalsuitsreinforcethestatusofindividualsasrights
holders, theyrespondthatgovernmenthasitsownrightsand maybethemost
interestedpartyinstructuralclaims.39 Toargumentsthatsovereignty-basedsuitsstrain
judiciallegitimacyandthatExparte Youngactionsweremeanttoassistindividuals
intheirclaimsagainstgovernment, theyrespondthatcausesofactionnotonlyserve
toprotectprivaterightsbutalsotopromoteenforcementoffederallaw.40
A. Dual Sovereignty v. Overlappingand Cooperative Federalism
Anarguableadvantageofemployingtraditionalactionsbetweengovernmentand
individualstotestgovernmentalpoweristhattheactionsreinforcedualsovereignty
32 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 77 (1868) (treating the case as an attempt to litigate the rights
ofsovereignty, ofpoliticaljurisdiction, ofgovernment, of corporate existence as a State).
33 Oregonv. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970);see also Missouriv. Holland, 252 U.S. 416
(1920) (relyingpartlyonsovereigntyinterestsinallowingastatetochallengefederallegis-
lationenactedtoimplementatreaty).
34 Cf. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 48586 (1923) (disallowing the states suit
toinvalidateafederalspendingstatuteallegedtoexceedcongressionalpowers).
35 Virginiaexrel. Cuccinelliv. Sebelius, 656 F.3d253 (4thCir. 2011), cert. denied, 133
S. Ct. 59 (2012).
36 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
37 Id.
38 See supra note10.
39 See supra notes 1112.
40 See supra note13.
2014] GOVERNMENTAL SOVEREIGNTY ACTIONS 217
principlesthat state and federal governments take their power directly from the people
andthattheyshouldgovernprincipalybyactingonthepeopleratherthanoneach
other.41 Somewhofavortheexpansionofsovereignty-basedsuits, however, seethisnot
asanadvantage, butratherasafailuretotakeintoaccounttheworldofoverlappingand
cooperativefederalism.42
Nodoubtthepowersofthefederalandstategovernmentsarenotsoclearly
dividedasinthepast.43 Butsuchchangesinfederalism donotsuggestthatthe
existingremedialsystem doesnotadequatelyaddresssuchchanges.
1. GovernmentInterestsSimilartoPrivatePartyInterests
Underoverlappingandcooperativefederalism, boththestateandfederalgovern-
mentsmaybeinmoredirectlegalrelationshipswithoneanotherthanunderamore
pristinedualfederalism model. Totheextentthesegovernmentsareindirectrelation-
ships, however, theywilgeneralyhavetraditionalremediesagainstoneanother.44 For
example, becauseprivatepartiesgeneralycanchalengeallegedlyultraviresgovern-
mentalregulation, sotoowilgovernments, asregulatedparties, havecausesofaction
(undercategory(2) above). Thus, ifastatepurportstotaxthefederalgovernment, the
federalgovernmentcanseektoenjointhattax.45 Ifalocalgovernmentatemptsto
regulatemilitaryrecruitmentofminors, thefederalgovernmentasregulatedpartiescan
seekaninjunctionagainstthestatute.46 Andifthefederalgovernmentseekstoforcea
statetolegislateasinNewYork v. United States,47 oriscoercingstatecooperationas
intheAffordableCareActcase,48 thestateisinapositionlikearegulatedpartywho
canseektoenjoinultraviresregulation.49 Thesesuitstaketheform offundamental
41 See supra notes 67.
42 See Davis, supra note 10, at 5152 (arguing that theories that see federalism as a
problem ofoverlappingandmutuallysupportingpolicymakingnetworksratherthanof
separate spheres support broader government standing to assert institutional interests).
43 See, e.g., CatherineM. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L. REV. 521,
570 (2012) [hereinafterSharkey, Inside Agency Preemption](describingcooperationbetween
theEnvironmentalProtectionAgencyandstateregulators).
44 Cf. Woolhandler&Colins, supra note5, at508 (indicatingthatcourtsshouldallowstates
standingtochalengefederallegislationthatdirectlyregulatesstateadministrativemachinery).
45 See, e.g., UnitedStatesv. DistrictofColumbia, 558 F. Supp. 213 (D.D.C. 1982)
(holding, inasuitbroughtbytheUnitedStates, thattheCapitolHistoricalSocietyisa
federalinstrumentalityandthuswasnotliableforD.C. salestax). Privatepartiestraditionally
hadactionstoenjointaxes, althoughtheTaxInjunctionAct, 28 U.S.C. §1341, now directs
them tostaterefundremedies.
46 See UnitedStatesv. CityofArcata, 629 F.3d986, 989 (9thCir. 2010) (holdingthatthe
UnitedStateshadstandingbecausethecitieswereseekingtoregulatethegovernmentdirectly).
47 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
48 Natl Fedn of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
49 See id. Theoriginalcomplaintbythestatesraisedthecoercionclaim aswellasachal-
lenge to the individual mandate. Complaint at ¶¶ 2124, 5458, 6367, Florida v. U.S. Dept
218 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 23:209
legalrelationsofonepartyseekingadeterminationofimmunityfrom theclaimed
exerciseofgovernmentpower.
2. AdministrativeReview Actions
Whatismore, manycooperativefederalism andconditionalspendingprograms
areadministeredthroughfederaladministrativeagencies. Statesparticipateinfed-
eralagenciesinavarietyofways, includingbyconsultingascontemplatedunder
executiveordersandstatutes, bysubmittingcommentsduringrulemaking, andby
seekingfederalagencyapprovalunderconditionalspendingprograms.50 Whilemost
oftheseinteractionsdonotresultinlawsuits,51 statesmayinmanycasesbeconsid-
eredpartiesaggrievedwhocansueundertheAPA.52 Discussionsofgovernment
standingandimpliedrightstendtobracketAPA andrelatedsuitsbecausetheyare
statutory,53 butsuchsuitsarerelevanttodeterminingiftheremedialsystem accom-
modatestherealitiesofmodernfederalism.
a. Administrative review suits similar to those of private parties. In many
instances, astate-plaintiffmaybeanalogoustoaprivatepartyaggrieved. Forex-
ample, ifthefederalgovernmentthreatensfundcut-offsunderaconditionalspending
ofHealth& HumanServs., 780 F. Supp. 2d1256 ,1307 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (No. 3:10-cv-91).
Amendedcomplaintsincludedasplaintiffsthebusinessgroupandindividuals, apparently
toobviatethestatestandingissueswithrespecttotheindividualmandatechallenge. See
Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 2628, 2010 WL 2114067. In addition, the bankruptcy of one of
theindividualplaintiffsledtothesubstitutionofanotherpartyintheSupremeCourt. See
HeatherElliott, Does the Supreme Court Ignore StandingProblems to Reach the Merits?
Evidence (or Lack Thereof)from the Roberts Court, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 189, 205
(2014);see also Bowenv. Pub. AgenciesOpposedtoSoc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 (1986)
(rejectingonthemeritsclaimsbystatesandsubdivisionsthatafederalstatutehadabrogated
contractual obligations when it ended the states option of voluntary withdrawal from the
socialsecuritysystem).
50 See generally Miriam Seifter, States as Interest Groups in the Administrative Process,
100 VA. L. REV. 953 (2014) (describingtheroleofstateorganizationsintheadministrative
process, includingtheirrolesunderexecutiveordersandspecificstatutes);Sharkey, Inside
Agency Preemption, supra note 43, at547 (describing improvementsto consultation
processesaftertheObamaadministrationdirectedmorereluctancetopreemptstatelaw). The
executiveordersthatdirectconsultationwithagenciesarenotjudiciallyenforceable. See
generally NinaA. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 77374
(2004) (discussingfederalism executiveorders).
51 Cf. Miriam Seifter, States, Agencies, and Legitimacy, 67 VAND. L. REV. 441, 460
(2014) (indicating that most of the important exchanges between states and agencies occur
prior to the proposal of a rule).
52 APA suits, as used herein, can include review actions under statutes with their own
review provisionsandthusthatarenotnecessarilyundertheAPA.
53 See, e.g., Davis, supra note 10, at 48 (indicating that the tradition of nonstatutory
review of federal official action has largely been supplanted by the [APA]).
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program, thestatecanseekreview similarlytoaprivatepartythreatenedwithwith-
drawalofacertificationtoparticipateinaprogram ortoreceivegovernmentfunds.54
Andlikeprivateparties, statesmaybeabletoraiseclaimsasregulatorybeneficiaries,
asinsomeenvironmentalclaims.55
b. Administrative review suits that deviate from the private analogy. Deviating
from theprivateanalogy, however, stateshavebeenabletousesovereigntyinterests
asthebasisforAPA orrelatedactionsattackingagencydeterminationsthatpurport
topreemptstatelaw. Thesestatenonpreemptionsuitsseem tohavesurfacedmostfre-
quentlyunderstatutoryschemesinwhichCongresscontemplatedanongoingrolefor
stateregulationthatdovetailswithfederalregulation.56 Forexample, theTransportation
Actof192057 providedthattheInterstateCommerceCommission(ICC) couldorder
changesinintrastateratesthatweresetbystateagenciesiftheICC foundthatsuch
ratesdiscriminatedagainstinterstatecommerce.58 TheICC wasrequiredtonotify
affectedstates, whichcouldthenparticipateintheproceedings,59 andwhich, onoc-
casion, soughtreview oforderschangingtheotherwisestate-setrates.60 Similarly, the
54 Cf. Connecticutv. Duncan, 612F.3d107 (2dCir. 2010) (holdingunripeachallengeunder
the APA to the Department of Educations refusal to approve plan amendments and waivers).
55 Cf. Massachusettsv. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (recognizingstanding, relyinginpart
on the states proprietary interests).
56 Ohioexrel. Celebrezzev. United StatesDept. ofTransp., 766 F.2d228 (1985)
(holdingthatthestatehadstandingtoseekreview ofanagencypreemptiondetermination
wherethestatuteprovidedaprocedurefortheagencytodeterminepreemption);AT&T v.
IowaUtils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 374 (1999) (rejectingonthemeritsastatechallengetoFCC
regulationthatthestateallegedshouldhaveremainedwithinthelocaldomainunderthe
statutoryprovisionpreservingstatecontrolofintrastateregulation);cf. Sharkey, Inside
Agency Preemption, supra note43, at584 (indicatingthatstateattorneysgeneral, sometimes
coordinatedbytheNationalAssociationofAttorneysGeneral, haveopposedagencypre-
emptionthroughamicusbriefs).
57 ActofFeb. 28, 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-152, Ch. 91, 41 Stat. 456 (repealedin1933).
58 Id. at§416(4), 41 Stat. at484.
59 WheneverinanyinvestigationundertheprovisionofthisAct. . . there
shallbebroughtinissueanyrate. . . madeorimposedbyauthorityof
anyState. . . theCommission, beforeproceedingstohearanddispose
ofsuchissue, shallcausetheStateorStatesinterestedtobenotifiedof
theproceeding. TheCommissionmayconferwiththeauthoritiesof
anyStatehavingregulatoryjurisdictionovertheclassofpersonsand
corporationssubjecttothisActwithrespecttotherelationshipbetween
ratestructuresandpracticesofcarrierssubjecttothejurisdictionof
suchStatebodiesandoftheCommission.
Id. §416(3), 41 Stat. at484;see also Seifter, supra note 50, at 45562 (discussing both
generalandagency-specificrequirementsforconsultationwithstates, aswellasinformal
consultationmethods).
60 See, e.g., Floridav. UnitedStates, 282 U.S. 194 (1931) (reviewing, at the states
instance, ICC ordersthatincreasedcertainintrastate rates as part of the ICCs authority to
dosotopreventunjustdiscriminationsagainstinterstatecommerce);id. at208 (sustaining
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1934 CommunicationsActprovidedthattheActshouldnotbeconstruedtogivethe
FCC jurisdiction with respect to charges[] . . . or regulations for or in connection with
intrastate communication service,61 and the current Act provides a jurisdictional
separation process for allocating authority.62 Stateagencieshavefrequentlychal-
lengedFCC ordersascontrarytothereservationofintrastateauthority.63
SuchAPA suitsarenotnecessarilytheprincipalmeansjudiciallytotestagency
preemption. Rather, enforcementactionsbystatesandanticipatoryactionsbyenforce-
mentobjects, aswelassuitsbetweenprivateparties, remainimportantavenuestotest
agencypreemptiondecisions.64 Severaladministrativelaw scholars, however, have
argued thatadministrativeprocess, including judicialreview, mayofferthebest
mechanismfortestingagencypreemption, whilereinforcingfederalismintheprocess.65
Floridas objection that the statewide scope of the order was not supported by substantial
evidence);see also UnitedStatesv. Louisiana, 290 U.S. 70 (1933) (rejectingonthemeritsastate
challenge to the ICCs raising an intrastate rate as unjust discrimination); cf. Texasv. ICC, 258
U.S. 204 (1922) (involving both a removed state injunctive action against the railroads aban-
doning an intrastate road under ICC authority, and also the states injunctive action filed in fed-
eralcourtagainsttheICC andtherailroad);id. at212 n.1 (notingthatthestatuterequiredICC
noticetogovernorsandauthorizedequityactionsbystatestoenjoinabandonmentscontraryto
thestatute);id. at 21617 (holding, to avoid constitutionalproblems, thatthestatutedidnotalow
theICC toauthorizeabandonmentofawholyin-stateroad).
61 47 U.S.C. §152(b)(1).
62 47 U.S.C. §410(c);see also, e.g., Natl Assn of Util. Regulatory Commrs v. FCC,
880 F.2d 422, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (discussing jurisdictional separations).
63 See, e.g., AT&T v. IowaUtils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999) (challengingFCC regulations,
claimingthatlocalcompetitionprovisionsinthe1996 Actweretobeadministeredprimarily
by the states, and citing the 1934 Acts provision that the FCC was to regulate only interstate
matters); La. Pub. Serv. Commn v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355 (1986) (arguing that an FCC order
changingdepreciationrulesinterferedwithstatecontroloverintrastateserviceunderthe
statute); Natl Assn of Util. Regulatory Commrs v. FCC, 880 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(challengingagencypreemptionastoinsidewiringregulation).
64 Cf. Meltzer, supra note 25, at 4546 (indicating that no matter how the question of
deferencetoagencypreemptiondecisionsisresolved, preemptiondecisionswillarisein
variouscontexts, includinginstatecourts, wherefederalagencyparticipationisunlikely).
65 See, e.g.,BrianGale&MarkSeidenfeld, Administrative Laws Federalism: Preemption,
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1936, 1939,
197677 (2008) (arguing that because of comparative institutionalcompetency,federalagencies
shouldoftenbethepreferredinstitutionstodecideallocationsofauthoritybetweenthestates
andthefederalgovernment);GillianE. Metzger, Administrative Lawas the NewFederalism,
57 DUKE L.J. 2023, 2028, 206869 (2008) (arguing that administrative law has appropriate
mechanismsforconsideringfederalismissues);RichardA. Pierce, Regulation, Deregulation,
Federalism, and Administrative Law:Agency Power to Preempt State Regulation, 46 U.
PITT.L.REV. 607 (1985) (arguingthatagenciesareoftenbestsituatedtodeterminepreemption,
butshouldnotifystates, andtakeintoaccountfederalism interests);cf. Sharkey, Inside Agency
Preemption, supra note 43, at 526, 57273 (arguing for changes to agency procedures and
greaterattentionbystateandlocalgovernmentstoagencyrulemaking);Sharkey, Preemption
2014] GOVERNMENTAL SOVEREIGNTY ACTIONS 221
Theseproceedings, scholarsargue, mayencouragegreaterconsiderationofarguments
against preemptionnot only based on specific statutory provisions, but also based
onargumentsthatagenciesgeneralymustgiveadequateconsiderationtofederalism
impacts.66 Butquiteapartfrom whethertheAPA providesthebestwaytotestregula-
torypreemption, APA proceedings, togetherwithgovernmentalenforcementactions
andanticipatorysuitsaccommodateoverlappingfederalism.67
by Preamble, supra note 25, at 25657 (arguing for measures to make agencies more
attentivetofederalism impacts). But cf. Seifter, supra note50, at60 (arguingthatwhilestate
organizationsthatappearbefore agencies are good atresisting federalpower, such
organizationsmaynotwellservegoalsofexpertiseandaccountability).
Thereisongoingdiscussionoftheappropriatelevelsofjudicialscrutinyofagency
preemptiondecisions. See, e.g., Galle& Seidenfeld, supra note65, at2001 (proposingan
amalgam of Skidmore [v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)]deferenceandhardlook
review); Mendelson, supra note 50, at 74142 (arguing that while agencies have incentives
not inferior to Congresss to takestateinterestsintoaccount, Skidmore deferenceratherthan
Chevron [v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)]deferenceisnone-
theless appropriate for agencies preemptive interpretations of statutes); Thomas W. Merrill,
Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 730 (2008) (arguingthat
courts are the least-worse institutions ultimatelytodecidepreemptionissuesarisingfrom
agency-administeredregulatorystatutes);id. at760 (arguingthatagencypreemptionshould
onlyoccurbyagencydecisionshavingtheforceoflaw, thatagenciesneedfairlyexplicit
delegationsiftheyaretodisplacestatelaw bytheirownauthority, andthatcourtsshould
generallygiveaform ofdeferenceshortofthatprescribedbyChevron);Metzger, supra note
65, at210506 (suggestingthatratherthanemphasizingChevron, thecourtsshouldplace
asomewhatgreaterburdenofexplanationonagencieswherestateshavetraditionallyplayed
asubstantialregulatoryrole);Seifter, supra note 50, at 5862 (arguing that problems with
stateorganizationssuggestthatcourtsshouldnotadjustdeferencelevelsbasedonconsul-
tationwithsuchorganizations);Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble, supra note 25, at 25657
(suggestingthatthecourtsmightconditiondeferenceonadherencetoprocessesthatencourage
participationbystatesandvariousoutsidegroups);ErnestA. Young, Executive Preemption,
102 NW.U.L.REV. 869, 89192 (2008) (suggestingaform ofSkidmore deference, customized
tothecontextofagencyinterpretationstatutes);cf. Hils, supra note10, at57 (arguingfora
non-preemptionruleforstatelawthatgivesaform ofChevron deferencetostatelawmakers);
Meltzer, supra note 25, at 14346 (summarizing the debate).
66 See, e.g., Metzger, supra note65, at2054 (arguingthatordinaryadministrativelaw
toolsprovideanappropriatewaytoconsiderfederalism concernsbywayofreviewofstatu-
toryauthority, adherencetoproceduralmandates, andrequirementsofadequatejustification);
Pierce, supra note 65, at 66364 (viewing agencies, when using notice and comment rule-
making, asinstitutionalysuitedtoresolvepreemptionissues, particularlybasedonastandard
lookingtosubstantialanddisproportionateinterstatespillovers).
67 Cf. UnitedStatesv. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) (indicatingthatthetankerassociation
broughtsuitagainststateandlocalofficialsalegingthatthestateregulationswerepreempted,
indicatingthattheUnitedStatesintervenedonappeal);id. at 11617 (holding several regu-
lationspreemptedandindicatingthatothersshouldbeconsideredinlightofafullerrecord
thatcouldbedevelopedwiththeUnitedStatesnowasaparty);id. at117 (indicatingthatthe
statutedirectedtheCoastGuardtoconsultwithstateandlocalgovernments).
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3. ImpliedStateNon-PreemptionActionsbyAnalogytoAPA Actions?
Itmightbeargued, however, thattheexistenceofstatenon-preemptionclaims
undertheAPA suggeststhatgovernmentsshouldbeabletobringclaims, challeng-
ing each others statutes on preemption ornon-preemptiongrounds, evenwithout
statutory authorization. But, as noted above, a partys ability to litigate a particular
interestinonecontextdoesnotanswerthequestionofwhethershecanbringacause
ofactioninanother. Toreinindelegatedpower, administrativereview allowsfor
anexpandeduniverseofcomplainantsandargumentsthanistrueforimpliedrights
ofaction. Forexample, aregulatorybeneficiarycancomplainthatanagencyin
rulemaking has insufficiently regulated another, raising issues such as the agencys
failuretofollow noticeandcommentprocesses, failuretogiveadequateconsider-
ationtoimportantobjections, aswellasfailuretoadheretostatutesundervarying
levels of deference. It does not follow from the regulatory beneficiarys APA cause
ofactionagainsttheagency, however, thatthebeneficiaryhasanimpliedaction
directlyagainsttheregulatedpartyforviolationsoftheorganicstatute. Rather,
beneficiaries actions directly against regulated parties generaly require explicit stat-
utoryauthorization. Nordoesaregulatorybeneficiaryhaveaviablecauseofaction
whenCongressexercisesitsnondelegated68 powertoregulatelessthanthebenefi-
ciarywouldlike.69
Similarly, allowingstatestoquestionagencypreemptiondecisionsarguably
provides a check on agencies somewhat anomalous and controversial power to
makeexplicitdeterminationsthatstateregulationposesanobstacletoachievement
ofthegoalsoffederalregulation.70 It does not follow from states ability to bring
APA non-preemptionclaimsthatastateshouldbeabletobringactionschallenging
Congresss legislation that the state claims unlawfully preempts state law and treads
onreservedpowers.71
68 Congressdoesexercisepowerdelegatedfrom thepeople.
69 See Huq, supra note 12, at 150506 (notingthatreliefisnotavailablebecauseof
Congresss failure to enact a law, such that there is a deregulatory slant in private structural
constitutionallitigation).
70 See, e.g., Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, supra note43, at526 n.14 (referringto
debate about the ascendency of federal agencies in the preemption realm); Young, supra
note65, at878 (arguingthatthepoliticalandproceduralsafeguardsoffederalism areabsent
when the Executive rather than Congress preempts state law). While agencies making of
regulations that may directly conflict with state law is inevitable, agencies determinations
ofobstaclepreemptionisasomewhatmorejarringexerciseofdelegatedpower. See Merrill,
supra note65, at731 (indicatingthatmostdisputesaboutpreemptionfocusondisplacements
ratherthantrumpingstatelaw).
71 Cf. Walsh, supra note 5, at 71 (indicating that states APA suits were statutorily
authorizedandinvolvedagencyinterferencewithsomeparticularactivityofthestate);
Metzger, supra note 65, at 2086 (The states constitutionalsignificancealoneseemssuf-
ficientgroundonwhichtorequirethatagenciesconsiderandjustifytheimpactofaproposed
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Attorney General Cuccinellis challenge to the Affordable Care Act argued that
theActtrenchedonreservedstatepowers, includingbyitspreemptiveeffectonastate
law that forbade requirements to buy insurancea statute enacted in reaction to the
ACA.72 ManyofthecasesCuccinellicited, however, weresuitsinwhichtheAPA
orasimilarstatutoryreview provisionwasabasisfortheclaim.73 Forexample, in
Alaska v. Department of Transportation,74 stateschalengedanagencyorderpreempt-
ingstateregulationofairlineadvertisingforlackofnoticeandcommentandreasoned
decisionmaking.75 AndinOhio exrel Celebrezze v. Department of Transportation,76
the state challenged the agencys preemption of state regulation of transportation of
nuclear materialsa determination made under an explicit statutory procedure for
agencypreemptiondeterminations.77
InCuccinelli, the Fourth Circuit distinguished these casesnot because they were
based on the APAbut because the plaintiff-states had active regulatory programs
thatwouldbeaffectedbythechallengedfederalagencypreemptiondeterminations,
unlikethebare-boneVirginiastatutethatCuccinellireliedon.78 ButevenifVirginia
hadamoreactivestateprogram concerninghealthinsuranceobligations, thequestion
would remain as to whether a states conflicting sovereignty claim states a cause of
actionforchallengingcongressionallegislation, asdistinguishedfrom achallenge
toagencyactionundertheAPA. Betterestablishedcausesofactionwerereadily
regulation on the states regulatory role, at least absent indication that Congress intended
agenciestoignorethisfactor. Butataminimum, statutoryprovisionforastateregulatory
rolefor instance, in cooperative regulatory schemes or savings clauses limiting preemption
providesafirm basisforrequiringthatagenciestakeseriouslytheimpactaproposedregu-
lation will have on the states. (footnote omitted)).
72 Complaint, Virginiaexrel. Cuccinelliv. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d768 (E.D. Va.
2010) (No. 3:10CV188).
73 See Wyomingexrel. Crankv. UnitedStates, 539 F.3d1236, 1241 (10thCir. 2008)
(relyingontheAPA tochallengetheBureauof Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms decision
that the states expungement did not meet the federal statutory requirements that would allow
removaloffederalfirearmsdisabilities);Tex. OfficeofPub. Util. Counselv. FCC, 183 F.3d
393, 40809 (5th Cir. 1999) (complaining, inter alia, as to the FCCs allocation of certain
costsandclaimingencroachmentonstateauthority);Ohiov. UnitedStatesDept. ofTransp.,
766 F.2d 228, 23031 (6th Cir. 1985) (reviewing DOT preemption of state rules as to
shippingnuclearmaterials);Alaskav. UnitedStatesDept. ofTransp., 868 F.2d441 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (challengingDOT ordersastoairplaneadvertising). See generally Appellees
OpeningandResponseBriefat6, 18, 20, Virginiaexrel. Cuccinelliv. Sebelius, 656 F.3d
253 (4thCir. 2012) (Nos. 11-1057, 11-1058) (citingthesedecisions).
74 868 F.3d441 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
75 See id. at 44243 (indicatingthatstatesasbodiespoliticwerewithintheambitofthe
AviationAct).
76 766 F.2d228 (6thCir. 1985).
77 See id. at 23031 (referring to provisions regardingstatehazardousmaterialregulation).
78 Virginiaexrel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 26970 (4th Cir. 2011); id. at268
(reasoningalsothatVirginiawasnotdirectlyregulatedbytheindividualmandate).
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availabletochallengethefederalstatute. Individualscouldchallengetheindividual
mandatethe target of Cuccinellis attackbased on the federal governments lack
ofenumeratedpowers.79 Andstatescouldchalengetheprogram basedontheirundue
coercionclaim, similartochallengesbyprivatepartieswhoaredirectlyregulated
orcoercedbygovernment.80
4. ReverseAPA ActionsbytheFederalGovernment?
Federalagencieshavesometimesbroughtimpliedactionstoenforcethepre-
emptiveeffectsoffederalregulationonstateregulation. Forexample, theFederal
HomeLoanBankBoardsuedastateagencyclaimingthatfederallaw preempteda
state law restricting the use of the word bank in advertising.81 Alreadypendingin
statecourtwasastateenforcementsuitagainstasavingsandloancompanyforvio-
latingthestateadvertisingrestriction.82
OnecouldarguablytreattheseactionsasreversalsofthestateAPA non-preemp-
tionclaimsagainstthefederalgovernment. Thefederalgovernment, however, isthe
party aggrieving rather than a party aggrieved under the APA, and thus lacks
statutoryauthorizationtobringsuchsuitsasaplaintiff. Theneedtoreinindelegated
power, moreover, providesajustificationforallowingnontraditionalclaimants, in-
cludingstates, tobringcertainchalengestoagencyaction. Bycontrast, allowingnon-
statutoryfederalclaimsallowstheexecutivetoexpanditsdelegatedpower.
B. Arguments that Government Is Litigatingits Own Rights
Traditionalclaimsbetweenindividualsandgovernmentreinforcethestatusof
individualsasrightsholdersevenastostructuralclaims. Thosefavoringbroader
governmentstanding, however, emphasizethatgovernmentisassertingitsownrights
whenitbringssovereigntyclaims.83 Indeed, theyevenarguethatgovernmentshave
79 See Florida v. United States Dept of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1243
(11thCir. 2011) (notreachingthequestionofwhetherthestateshadstandingtochallenge
theindividualmandatebecausethegovernmentdidnotcontestthestandingoftheNFIB and
concededthestandingofanindividualplaintiff);affd in part, revd in part, sub nom. NFIB
v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (notdiscussingstandingissues). Thedistrictcourt, relying
onthedistrictcourtopinioninCuccinelli, heldthatthestateswithlegislationrespecting
insurancemandatesdidhavestandingtocontesttheindividualmandate, butitdidnotreach
thestandingissueastootherstates. Floridaexrel. Bondi v. United States Dept of Health
& HumanServs., 780 F. Supp. 2d1256 (N.D. Fla. 2011).
80 648 F.3d at 1243 (noting that the federal government did not dispute states standing
tochallengetheMedicaidprovisions).
81 Fed. HomeLoanBankBd. v. Empie, 778 F.2d1447 (10thCir. 1985).
82 Id. at 144950 (citing Okla. Bankers Assn v. Family Fed. Savings Bank, Creek Co.
Dist. Ct. No. C-83-181).
83 See supra notes 1112.
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theprimaryinterestsinlitigatingstructuralclaims, andshouldoftenbepreferredto
individualchallengers.84
1. InterestsSeparatefrom Citizens?
Argumentsthatgovernmenthasitsowninterestaremeantinparttocircumvent
problemsofparens patriae suits(category(3) above). Undertheparens patriae
rubric, governmentsrelylargelyontheinterestsoftheircitizensinbringingsuit,
therebyraisingtheobviousobjectionthatindividualscanbringtheirownclaims.85
Whilesometimesreceptivetoparens patriae actions, thecourtshaveplacedvarious
andsomewhatunpredictablerestrictionsontheiruse.86 Forexampleitisfrequently
said, basedonMassachusetts v. Mellon,87 thatstatescannotassertparens patriae
standingagainsttheUnitedStates.88 AndtheUnitedStatesitselffacesrestrictions
84 See Huq, supra note12, at1515 (preferringinstitutionaltoprivatelitigantswould
conform to standing doctrine, which assigns judicialenforcementofaninterestsolelytothe
entity that formally holds and directly benefits from that interest); Crocker, supra note10, at
2085 (arguingthatstatesarebeterthanindividualsatprotectinginterestsinstatesovereignty);
Davis, supra note 10, at 79 (There are several reasons to prefer the United States over a
privatepartywhenitcomestoimplyingconstitutionalremediesforpublicrightsthatprotect
jurisdictional interests.); cf. RobertA. Weinstock, Note, The LoraxState:Parens Patriae and
the Provision of Public Goods, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 798 (2009) (arguingthatgovernment
is the appropriate party to litigate with respect to public goods).
85 See Crocker, supra note10, at2053 (disfavoringparens patriae suits, butfavoring
sovereignty-basedclaims);Davis, supra note10, at67 (same).
86 See Vladeck, supra note 5, at 85556 (describing the courts various requirements for
stateparens patriae);LarryW. Yackle, A Worthy Companion for Fourteenth Amendment
Rights:The United States in Parens Patriae, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 111, 14143 (1997) (same);
cf. Weinstock, supra note 84, at 82728, 83435 (arguing that the parens patriae interestsof
statesshouldnothavetomeettheinjuryinfactrequirement, andshouldnotbedistinguished
from sovereigntyinterests).
87 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
88 See Vladeck, supra note5, at857 (statingthattheCourthaslargelyheldtoparens
patriae limitationsonstatesuitsagainstthefederalgovernment). Undercertainstatutes,
particularlyrate-makingstatutes, thestateshavebeenabletopursueadministrativereview
ineffectivelyaparens patriae role. See, e.g., New Yorkv. UnitedStates, 331 U.S. 284
(1947) (contestingchangesinregionalrates);Conn. Dept. ofPub. Util. Controlv. FERC,
593 F.3d 30 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (contesting a federal agencys allowance of basis points for
returnoninvestments);see also Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, supra note43, at588
(describingprovisionsoffinancialregulationstatutethatallow amajorityofstatestoforce
theBureauofConsumerFinancialProtectiontotakeregulatoryaction). Commentatorshave
seenMassachusetts v. EPAalthough also based on proprietary interestsas expanding
stateparens patriae suitsagainstthefederalgovernment. See, e.g., BradfordMank, Should
States Have Greater StandingRights than Ordinary Citizens?:Massachusettsv. EPAs New
StandingTest for States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1701, 1771 (2008) (arguingthatstates
shouldbeabletofileparens patriae suitsagainstthefederalgovernmentifthelatterhas
failedtoperform astatutoryorconstitutionalduty);cf. JonathanRemyNash, Standingand
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on itsattemptstobring parens patriae suitstoenforcetherightsofcitizens.89
GovernmentallitigantssuchasthefederalexecutiveinArizona v. United States90
andtheVirginiaAttorneyGeneralinCuccinelli exrel. Virginia v. Sebelius thus
havefashionedtheirclaimsasbasedonsovereigntyinterestsratherthanasbased
onparens patriae.91
Whileitmaybeanalyticallypossibletoseparateouttheinterestsofindividuals
from thoseofgovernment, itisneverthelessworthnotingtheextenttowhich, asa
practicalmatter, sovereigntybasedsuitsmayresembleandsubstituteforparens
patriae suits,92 andbyextension, forindividualsuits.93 Forexample, federalgovern-
mentalchallengestostatetaxationofindividualsinfederalenclaves, whichthe
courts tend to justify by the United States sovereignty interests, effectively operate
asparens patriae suitsfortheindividualtaxpayers.94 Federalagencysuitstoenjoin
the Precautionary Principle, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 494, 51314 (2008) (arguing for state
standingtopursueclaimswherethereareuncertainbutpotentiallylargeharms). But cf. Cass,
supra note 5, at 7879 (arguing against state standing in Massachusetts v. EPA).
89 See, e.g., UnitedStatesv. Philadelphia, 644 F.2d187 (3dCir. 1980) (holdingthatthe
UnitedStatescouldnotsueforinjunctiverelieftoaddressallegedFourteenthAmendment
violationsbyPhiladelphiapolice);DebraLivingston, Police Reform and the Department of
Justice:An Essay on Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 815, 815 (1999) (indicatingthat
provisionsallowingtheDOJtosuewereenactedaftertheRodneyKingincident). Whilea
fewcasesallowedstatestosuelocalitiesunder§1983, see, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659
F.2d306 (3dCir. 1981), thatresultseemsquestionableinlightofInyo County v. Paitue-
Shoshone Indians, 538 U.S. 701 (2003), which held that an Indian tribe is not a person
entitledtosueunder§1983. See generally Davis, supra note 10, at 4244 (describing varying
resultsinparens patriae casesbythefederalgovernment).
90 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
91 Cuccinellietal., supra note11, at101 (distinguishingMassachusetts v. Mellon onthe
groundthatthefederalstatuteatissueinthatcasedidnotconflictwithastatelaw);id. at
11819 (arguing that Virginia was not asserting a quasi-sovereign interest in its ACA suit);
see also Davis, supra note10, at82 (arguingthatallowinggovernmentalsuitstovindicate
theirinstitutionalinterestswouldnotturnintoparens patriae, becausesuchsuitswouldbe
limitedtoclaimsunderconstitutionalrulesthatallocatejurisdictiontothebenefitofstates
aspoliticalcommunities).
92 Cf. Weinstock, supra note84, at800 (arguingagainstadistinctionbetweensovereign
and quasi-sovereign interests in that both involve the governments litigating to protect public
goods);Barron, supra note 11, at 224142 (arguing that parens patriae shouldincludethe
governments interest in maintaining its own capacity to serve as forum for democratic con-
testationandpolicy).
93 Cf. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, supra note43, at566 (notingarecentinstance
whentheConsumerProductSafetyCommissiontoldatradegroupthatthegroupcould
challengeanIllinoislaw onitsown).
94 Compare UnitedStatesv. LewisburgAreaSchoolDist., 539 F.2d301, 306 (3d. Cir.
1976) (decliningtodecideiftheUnitedStatescouldsuebasedoninterestsofresidentsof
federal enclave on whom the local government had imposed taxes because the interest which
theGovernmentseekstoprotectisitsownexclusiverightsassovereign, andtheinjuryit
alleges is a trespass against those sovereign rights), with UnitedStatesv. Ohio, 614 F.2d
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conflictingstateregulationgenerallyassistprivateregulatedpartieswhoarefacing
stateenforcementactions.95 Suchsuits, moreover, mayeffectivelyrelievetheassisted
partiesoffederalism basedlimitationsontheirownsuits, suchastheTaxInjunction
Act96 andYounger.97 Similarly, the United States suit to enjoin Arizonas immigration
101, 105 (6thCir. 1979) (abstaininginacaseinwhichthestatewassuingcertainfederal
contractorswheretheUnitedStatescouldinterveneinstateagencyproceeding). Taxsuits
bytheUnitedStatesonbehalfofcertainpartiesmayhaveagreaterjustificationintraditional
parens patriae, whichprotectedparticularlyvulnerablepartieswhomayhavehaddifficulties
protectingtheirowninterests. See, e.g., UnitedStatesv. ArlingtonCounty, 669 F.2d. 925,
92829 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 801 (1982) (allowingtheUnitedStatestosue,
basedonitsowninterests, tostoptaxesonaforeignmissionandtoobtainrelieffrom aprior
judgmentagainsttheGermanDemocraticRepublic);cf. CityofNew Yorkv. Permanent
MissiontoIndia, 618 F.3d172, 175 (2dCir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3056 (inaremoved
actioninwhichthefederalgovernmentappearedasanout-of-timeamicus, indicatingthat
theForeignMissionsActgavetheSecretaryofStatepowertopreemptstatetaxes, including
retroactively);Lewisburg, 539 F.2dat306 (citingsuitsonbehalfofIndians).
95 See, e.g., FederalHomeLoanBankBoardv. Empie, 778 F.2d1447, 1450 (10thCir.
1985) (allowingtheUnitedStatestofileanactiontoprotectitsownauthorityandtheentities
initsregulatorydomain, aswellasthegeneralpublic, althoughsuitswerependingbetween
theregulatedbankandthestate);id. at1452 (rejectingtheapplicationofYounger because
the United States interests were sufficiently different from that of the bank subject to the state
courtenforcementaction);cf. Cuomo v. Clearing House Assn, 557 U.S. 519 (2009) (reviewing
caseswhereabankinggroupaswellasthefederalagencychallengedthestateattorney
generals investigative request as preempted); cf. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, supra
note43, at555 (notingthattheOfficeoftheComptrollerofCurrencyhadmarketeditselfto
banksasaggressiveonpreemption, althoughCongresshadrecentlyimposedlimits).
96 28 U.S.C. §1341;see also FairAssessmentinRealEstatev. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 105
(1981) (holdingthatcomitybarredafederalactionformonetaryrelieffrom statetaxation).
97 See NLRB v. Nash-FinchCo., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971) (allowingtheBoardtoseek
aninjunction, withrespecttoamatterastowhichtheBoardclaimedexclusivejurisdiction,
againststatecourtproceedingsinwhichthestate court at the employers instance had limited
certainunionpicketing);id. at142 (holdingthattheactiondidnothavetomeetthenarrow
exceptionstotheAnti-InjunctionAct). See generally, Youngerv. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
Thelowercourtshavesometimestreatedprivatepartypreemptionclaimsaslesssubjectto
abstentionthanotherclaims. See GarrickB. Pursley, The Structure of Preemption Decisions,
85 NEB. L. REV. 912, 913, 957 (2007) (notingthatsomecourtsholdthatpreemptionissues
donotwarrantPullman abstention(see Railroad Commn of Texas v. Pullman Co, 312 U.S.
496 (1941)), butarguingthatpreemptiondecisionsshouldbeseenasconstitutionalquestions
andsubjecttoabstention);DanielJordanSimon, Abstention Preemption:Howthe Federal
Courts Have Opened the Door to the Eradication of Our Federalism,99 NW. U. L. REV.
1355, 1373, 1385 (2005) (arguingforapplicationofabstentiondoctrinesinpreemption
cases);PatrickJ. Smith, The Preemption Dimension of Abstention, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 310,
314, 320, 331 (1989) (discussingdifferentapproachesofcourtstoabstentioninpreemption
casesandarguingforapreemptionexceptiontoYounger);cf. Sprint Commcns v. Jacobs,
134 S. Ct. 584, 588 (2013) (wherethependingstateadministrativereviewactionwasnotacivil
enforcementproceedingakintoacriminalprosecutionandnotinitiatedbythestate, thefederal
courtcouldproceedwithaninjunctiveactionagainstallegedlypreemptedstateregulation).
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regulationswasinaidofthosewhowouldhavebeensubjecttothenew law, someof
whom werealreadychalengingthestatute.98
2. GovernmentastheMostInterestedPartyinSovereigntyClaims?
Oneresponseofthebroad-standingproponentstotheargumentforpreferring
suitsinvolvingindividualsisthatgovernmentsareperhapsthemostinterestedparties
instructuralfights.99 Andbecausestandingandcauseofactiondoctrinesoftentend
toallocatelitigableintereststothepartiesmostinterested,100 suchrightsshouldbe
allocatedtogovernment.101
Itisnotclear, however, thatthefederalgovernmentasopposedtotheregulated
partyhasthepreeminentinterestinchalengingalegedlypreemptedstateregulation.102
Gettingaroundstateenforcementprocesseswouldbecalledforifthefederalgovern-
ment claims irreparable harms to the governments interest in protecting national security
information. See, e.g., UnitedStatesv. Adams, 473 F. Supp. 2d108, 110 (D. Maine2007)
(allowing a United States suit to prevent Verizons compliance with a state public utility
commissions order investigating complaints by private parties that Verizon violated state
andfederallawbyprovidinginformationtotheNationalSecurityAgency);cf. UnitedStates
v. AT&T, 551 F.2d384, 385 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (involvingasuitbytheUnitedStates, inwhich
the House intervened, to stop AT&T from complying with a House subcommittees subpoena).
98 See CBS News, Arizona Immigration LawFaces NewLegal Fight, CBSNEWS (May18,
2010), htp://www.cbsnews.com/news/arizona-immigration-law-faces-new-legal-fight/(noting
fivependingchallenges).
99 See Huq, supra note 12, at 1491 (to the extent courts properly consider structural con-
stitutionalquestionsatall, itmakessensetoclosethedoor to all but institutional litigants.);
Crocker, supra note 10, at 2085 (arguing that private parties interests do not align perfectly
withthoseofthestates, andtheypossessneitherthenincentivesnortheresourcestopursue
sovereignty claims as effectively); Davis, supra note 10, at 7980 (arguing that the United
States institutional interests are their own and the government should control litigation as to
them);see also Barron, supra note 11, at 224243 (arguing thatmunicipalitiesandstates
haveaninterestinpreservingtheirlawmakingpowersagainstencroachmentsbyhigherlevels
ofgovernment, aswellasaninterestinprotectingtheircitizens).
100 See, e.g., RichardM. Re, Relative Standing, 102 GEO.L.J. 1191, 119495, 1211 (2014)
(arguingthatthestandingdoctrineoftenattemptstosecureplaintiffswhohavethegreatest
stakeinobtainingtherequestedrelief);see also Grove, supra note15, at809, 824 (discuss-
inghow theinjuryinfactrequirementlimitsprivateprosecutorialdiscretion, andhelpsto
protectprivatelibertyagainstarbitraryencroachment);AnnWoolhandler& CalebNelson,
Does History Defeat StandingDoctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 73233 (2004) (summa-
rizingmultipledimensionsofstandingdoctrine, includingpreventingusurpationofprivate
parties rights).
101 See Huq, supra note12, at1514 (individualstandingin structural claims will tend to
destabilize the federal-state and interbranch balances); Davis, supra note 10, at 7980
(characterizing the federal government as the real contestant as to public rights to govern).
102 Cf. Wyethv. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (holding, onreview ofatortsuit, that
FDA approvalofadrugdidnotpreemptstatetortactions);Cass, supra note 5, at 7879
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While the government interest may be broader, the regulated partys interest is often
more focused and concrete. For example, individuals detained under Arizonas im-
migrationlawswouldseem tohavetheparamountinterestinseeingthoselaws
invalidated. Bycontrast, theinterferencethattheUnitedStatesallegedwithits
enforcementdiscretionwasrelativelyamorphous103: that Arizonas policies inter-
fered with the federal governments careful and considered balance of national law
enforcement, foreign relations, and humanitarian interests.104 Andtortlitigantsmay
oftenhavethemostconcreteinterestsinwhetherfederalagencyactionpreempts
commonlaw claims.105
Whatismore, evenifoneweretoassumethatgovernmentsbetweenthemselves
havetheparamountinterestintheresultsofpreemptionbatles, itwouldnotfolowthat
governmentsshouldbeabletopursuetheirclaimsasplaintiffsinnon-statutorily
authorizedsuitsagainsteachother. CongressandthePresident, forexample, arguably
hadthelargeststakeswhenthelineitem vetowasinquestion.106 So, too, onemight
arguethatGeorgiahadagreaterinterestinchallengingReconstructionthandidan
(arguingthatstateattorneysgeneralareoftenpoliticallymotivated, andthatstatesuitsshould
beviewedwithapresumptionthattheyrepresentpoliticalfightsoverpolicy).
103 See UnitedStatesv. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d980, 1007 (D. Ariz. 2010) (finding
irreparable harm because the federal governments ability to enforce its policies and achieve
its objectives will be undermined by the states enforcement of statutes that interfere with
federallaw, eveniftheCourtweretoconcludethatthestatestatuteshavesubstantiallythe
same goals as federal law); affd, 641 F.3d339, 366 (9thCir. 2011) (statingthataconsti-
tutional infringement will often alone constitute irreparable harm, and that the interest of
preserving the Supremacy Clause is paramount) (quoting Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. Coal
for Econ. Equity, 950 F.2d 1401, 1412 (9th Cir. 1991); Cal. Pharmacists Assn v. Maxwell-
Jolly, 563 F.3d 847, 85253 (9th Cir. 2009)), affd, Arizonav. UnitedStates, 132 S. Ct.
2492, 2500 (2012) (addressingthemeritsofthepreemptionclaim).
104 Complaintat¶¶2, 4, UnitedStatesv. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d980 (D. Ariz. 2010)
(No. 2:10CV01423) (alleging, interalia, that the state law disrupted federal priorities that
focus on aliens who pose a threat to national security or public safety, imposed burdens on
federal agencies, caused detention and harassment of authorized visitors immigrants, and
citizens, and would ignore humanitarian concerns such as protecting aliens with well-
foundedfearsofpersecutionorwhoarevictimsofnaturaldisaster). Themostdirectinter-
ferencewiththefederalgovernmentmayhavebeenthatArizonamightrefercertaindetained
individualstothefederalsystem, althoughthefederalgovernmentwouldnothaveexerted
enforcementeffortstowardsthosepersons. Thefederalgovernment, however, presumably
couldreleasethoseindividuals, perhapsleadingtopoliticalembarrassmenttoofficialsbut
notirreparableharm tothefederalgovernment.
105 Cf. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, supra note43, at571, 583 (notingthatitwas
unclearwhorepresentsthestateinterestwhenfederalregulationpreemptsstatetortlaw);
Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble, supra note 25, at 25556 (noting trial lawyers objections to
certainagencypreemptiondecisions). Relyingontraditionalsuitsbetweenthegovernmentand
individuals, moreover, couldprovidegreaterinsightintowhetherstateregulationsdoinfactpose
anobstacletothefederalscheme, becausesuchclaimslooktotheactualeffectsonindividuals.
106 See Rainesv. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997) (holdingthatmembersofCongress
lackedstandingtochallengetheLineItem VetoAct).
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individualincarceratedbyamilitarycommissionsuchasLamdinMiligan.107 Butsuch
powervs. powerdisputestraditionalyremaininthepoliticalrealm untilthelawcomes
tobearonindividualswhomaybringclaimsofimmunityorright.108 Atleastasfaras
thejudicialsystemisconcerned, individualsremainthemostinterestedpartiesinclaims
thatagovernmenthasactedultravires.109
Itistrue, asproponentsofbroadstandingclaim, thatintergovernmentalsuits
allow forspeedyandbroaddeterminations,110 asinArizona v. United States.111 But
speedandbreadthofdecisionhaveneverbeenaprimaryaim ofstandingandcause
of action rules. Rather, the legitimacy of a federal courts pronouncing on issues of
governmentalpowerhasbeenpremisedlargelyonthenecessityofdecidingthe
rightsandimmunitiesofindividualswhowillsufferconcreteinjuries.
MichaelCollinsandI havepreviouslyargued, moreover, thatrecognizingbroad
governmentalstandinginsovereignty-basedsuitscouldunderminetheroleofindi-
vidualsasrightsholders,particularlywithrespecttostructuralclaims.112 Theseconcerns
arenotentirelyfanciful, giventhatproponentsofgovernmentalsovereigntyclaims
arguethatintergovernmentalsuitsarethebestform oflitigationforstructuralclaims.113
Indeed, onerecentcommentatorarguesthatgovernmentalsuitsshoulddisplacepri-
vatesuitsastostructuralclaims.114 Hewouldextendhisprohibitioneventobarring
107 Compare Georgiav. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 70 (1868) (disallowingchallenge),
with Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 131 (1866) (deciding an individual detainees
challengetothejurisdictionofamilitarytribunalinIndiana).
108 AsAlexanderBickelstatedincriticizingSouth Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301
(1966):
Butitisaltogetherdifferentforastatetoberaising, asdidSouth
Carolina, nothingmorethanherinterestintheexecutionofherown
lawsratherthanthoseofCongress, andherinterestinhavingCongress
enactonlyconstitutionallawsforapplicationtohercitizens. A stateis
saidtohavenostandinginsuchcircumstances, notbecausetheinterests
assertedareunrealorinadequatelyparticulartothestate, butbecause
byhypothesistheyshouldnot, insuchcircumstances, sufficetoinvoke
judicialaction.
Bickel, supra note5, at88;cf. Clintonv. CityofNew York, 523 U.S. 417, 425 (1998)
(includingactionsbroughtbyindividuals, associations, andNewYorkCityforlossofbene-
fitsduetothelineitem veto).
109 But cf. Huq, supra note 12, at 1516 (characterizing criminal defendants structural
challenges to criminal statutes as raising the interests of third-party institutions).
110 Davis, supra note 10, at 7576 (arguing that implied anticipatory governmental actions
permit regulated parties to determine ex ante whether their conduct is sanctionable, save
private parties from anxiety, and contribute to the development of constitutional law by
encouragingrelativelyencompassingpronouncements as to its content). But cf. id. at76
n.408 (indicatingthatsomemightseethisbreadthasavice).
111 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
112 Woolhandler& Collins, supra note 5, at 43940, 50304.
113 See supra note104.
114 Huq, supra note 12, at 1514 (proposing that [w]hen an individual litigant seeks to en-
forceastructuralconstitutionalprincipleredoundingtothebenefitofanofficialinstitution,
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criminal defendants from defending on the ground that the criminal statute invoked
exceeded Congresss enumerated powers and thus trenched on states authorities.115
C. Private Rights v. Regulatory Model of Litigation?
1. RegulatoryPurposes
Governmentalstandingproponentsarguethatsuchaprivaterightsbasedview of
causesofactionistoorestrictive. Proponentsarguethatcourts, inimplyingrightsof
action, shouldtakeintoaccountaregulatoryroleofhelpingtoenforcefederallaw.116
Governments, however, canordinarilytesttheirpowersbybringingagainst
individuals statutorily authorized enforcement actionsthe paradigmatic form of
government-initiated regulatory litigation. And private parties actions against gov-
ernment or its officials enforce federal law norms, at the same time that the courts
implyingsuchactionsisjustifiedbytheirtraditionalroleofprotectingprivaterights.
Argumentsthatthecourtsshouldimplyadditionalcausesofactionforregulatory
purposesneedtotakeintoaccountthatstatutorilyauthorizedenforcementsuitsand
individuals anticipatory actions already serve regulatory purposes.
Thebroad-standingproponents, however, arguethatgovernmentimpliedsuits
arebetterthanprivate-partyactions, relyingonstandardargumentsagainstimplying
rightsofactioninprivatepartiestoenforcestatutes.117 Impliedprivatesuits, ithasbeen
andthereisnoreasonthelattercouldnotenforcethatinterestitself, afederalcourtshould
notpermittheindividuallitiganttoallegeandobtainreliefonthebasisoftheseparationof
powers or federalism); id. (indicatingthatinmostcasesthiswouldproveacategoricalbar
to individual cases because the governmental institution would have standinge.g., Congress,
theexecutive, andthestates).
115 Huq, supra note12, at1516;see also id. at1442, 1516. Huqdisagreedwiththe
Supreme Courts decision in United States v. Bond, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011), reversingthe
Third Circuits decision that a criminal defendant who had attempted to harm her husbands
lovercouldnotchallengeonTenthAmendmentgroundsherprosecutionunderafederal
statute forbidding possession or use of any chemical where not intended for a peaceful
purpose. Congress enacted the statute to implement an international chemical weapons
convention. The federal government argued against Bonds standing in the Court of Appeals,
butchangeditspositionintheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt. See 131 S.Ct. at2361;cf. Davis,
supra note10, at80 (assumingthatthevalidruledoctrinewouldpersisttoallowindividuals
toraiseclaimswhenprotectingprivaterights).
116 See Davis, supra note10, at66 (arguingExparte Youngshouldbereadinmore
regulatoryratherthannarrow adjudicatoryterms).
117 See, e.g., id. at 2526 (discussing various advantages of public over private enforcement);
Huq, supra note 12, at 150912 (arguing thattheincentivesofinstitutionallitigantsarebetter
at producing optimal litigation, due to institutional actors repeat player status, whereas private
parties are one-shot players representing interest groups pursuing self-interested strategies
orthogonaltothegoalsofpreservingstructuralconstitutionalprinciplesormaximizingoverall
social welfare).
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said, raiseproblemsofaccountabilityandoverenforcement, particularlywhenlayered
onto(andcomparedto) governmentalregulatoryenforcementschemes118schemes
assumedtobeprovidedforbystatute.119 Publicofficialshavedemocraticaccountability
lackinginindividuals. Andasofficerschargedwithrepresentingthecommonwealth
whoreceivenodirectprivatebenefitsfrom governmentsuits, theyarelikelytoreinin
theoverbreadthofstatutes120 andotherwiseexerciseapublic-regardingdiscretionin
alocatingenforcementresourcesamongthecasesthattheofficialscouldpotentialy
bringundertheirstatutoryauthority.121
Theproponentsofgovernmentalimpliedrightsarguethattheseadvantagesof
governmentsuitspersistwhentransferredtogovernmentalimpliedrightsofaction.122
Theargumentsbasedonaccountabilityandbalancedgovernmentenforcementdis-
cretion, however, losemuchoftheirforcewhentransferredtosuitsbygovernment
118 See DavidFreemanEngstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALEL.J. 616,
63041 (2013) (addressing arguments for preferring public over private enforcement);
MargaretH. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 70407
(2011) (summarizingthescholarshipandargumentsastotheadvantagesanddisadvantages
ofpublicandprivateenforcement).
119 Cf. StephenB. Burbanketal., Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637,
662, 667 (2013) (summarizingadvantagesanddisadvantagesofprivateenforcementvs.
public);id. at 67175 (discussing how legislatures should structure enforcement regimes).
120 See, e.g., William M. Landes& RichardA. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law,
4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15, 3132 (1975) (discussing problems of overenforcement if private
criminalprosecutionwereallowed, includingthatprivateenforcerswouldnotreininpenal
laws overbreadth). But cf. MargaretH. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public
Enforcement, 127 HARV. L. REV. 853, 85657 (2014) (arguing that governments often have
financialincentivesiftheyretainaportionoffinancialrewards, andalsobecauselargerecov-
eries may enhance officers reputational interests); Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys
General and the First Amendment, 103 MICH. L.REV. 589, 595 (2005) (arguingthereshould
benopreferenceforgovernmentaloverprivateenforcementwheretheenforcementarguably
restrictsfreespeech).
121 See, e.g., RichardB. Stewart& CassR. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights,
95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 129093 (1983) (discussing problems of implying private rights of
action, includingdisruptinglegislativejudgmentsastoappropriateenforcementlevelsand
undermining congressionaldecisionsto entrustregulation to agencies). See generally
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHLERS THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 70810 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing arguments for and against implied
privaterightsofaction).
122 See Davis, supra note 10, at 4748 (arguing that thegovernmentwillexerciseprose-
cutorialdiscretionandhasgreaterlegitimacythanprivateenforcers);id. at48 (publicofficials
lackpersonalfinancialmotivationandoperateunderresourceconstraints);id. at28 (noting
someproblemsastopoliticalambitionsanddesiretobenefitstatetreasuries, butstilassuming
thatdifferencesaresufficienttotreatpublicimpliedactionsdifferently);Huq, supra note12,
at1490 (arguingthatinstitutionallitigantsaremorelikelytopursueappropriateinstitutional
litigation, whereasprivatepartieswilltendtopursuelitigationtoobtainprivategoodsthey
cannotobtainthroughthepoliticalprocess);id. at1494 (arguingthatstructuralclaimsinvolve
institutionalbalancingandthatinstitutionallitigantscanhelpensuremorestableequilibria).
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that are not authorized by statute. The executives accountability derives, after al, not
only through the executives election, but also from Congresss authorization of the
executives actions. Indeed, executive action generaly, and particularly in initiating
suitstovindicatefederallaw, presumptivelyrequirescongressionalauthorization. And
incontrasttoexercisingdiscretiontoreininstatutoryoverbreadthastoauthorized
suits, theexecutive, inbringingimpliedsuitspurportstocuretheallegedunderbreadth
ofstatutes. Ratherthanusingitsdiscretiontoalocateenforcementresourcesamong
statutorilyauthorizedactions, theexecutiveexercisesdiscretiontoexpandavailable
actionsbeyondwhatthelegislatureprovided.123
The legitimacy problems are highlighted by broad-standing proponents arguments
thatimpliedgovernmentsuitsnotonlyareappropriatetovindicatesovereigntyin-
terests (this Articles principal focus), but also to vindicate administrative interests
ofgovernmentinimplementingastatutoryscheme.124 Suchimpliedsuitsareeffec-
tivelyimpliedenforcementactionsagainstindividuals.125 Theregulatorymodelthat
purportstoadvancetheimplementationoffederallaw, then, wouldputasidethe
federal statutes lack of authorization and the Constitutions requirement of such
authorizationforgovernmentalenforcementactions.126
123 Huqarguesthathistorically, institutionshavenotoverlitigated. Huq, supra note12,
at1513. Limitsongovernmentalstanding, however, mayaccountforsomeofthepresumed
restraintofgovernmentlitigants. See generally Lemos& Minzner, supra note120 (discussing
incentivesofgovernmentplaintiffs). Itisofcourseundeniablethattherearefewerpotential
governmentalthanprivatelitigants.
124 See Davis, supra note10, at20 (arguingtherewaslessworryaboutimpliedgovernment
suitsoutsideofcriminalenforcement). SomeofthecasesDavisdiscussesinvolveimplying
remedies, suchasdisgorgement, aspartofanotherwiseauthorizedenforcementsuit. Id. at4 n.5,
5354; United States v. Lane Labs, 427 F.3d 219, 220 (3dCir. 2005) (orderingrestitution
tocustomerswhoboughtproductsadvertisedashavingmedicalbenefits);cf. JackGoldsmith
& JohnF. Manning, The Presidents Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280, 2293 (2006)
(whilegenerallyarguingforpresidentialauthoritytoprescribeincidentaldetailstocomplete
astatutoryscheme, discussingprosecutorialdiscretiononlywithrespecttoauthorizedcivil
andcriminalenforcementactions).
125 See Davis, supra note10, at6 (favoringimpliedrightswhengovernmentofgovernment
sues to vindicate administrative interests in the implementation of federal law). Davis
places some such implied enforcement actions under his category of institutional interests.
Id. at50 (treatingafederalsuittoenforceastatutethatrestrictedforeclosuresagainstactive
servicemembersasprotectinginstitutionalinterests).
Iftheimpliedpublicactionseemstobeanecessarycomponentofthescheme, thenthe
Courtsarelikelytoimplythem astheywouldforprivateparties. Attimes, Davisseemsto
befavoringnomorethannot-quite-explicitlystatutorilyauthorizedactions. Id. at32, 49. If
thatisallheisarguingfor, however, hewouldeffectivelybeputtingimpliedpublicactions
moreorlessonasimilarfootingwithimpliedprivateactions, aconclusionhegenerally
wantstoavoidwithrespecttogovernmentsuitstovindicateadministrativeandinstitutional
interests. See id. at25.
126 Cf. Grove, supra note15, at834 (arguingthatArticleII isarestraintongovernment
standinggiven, interalia, potentialintrusionsonindividualliberty).
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2. SupremacyClaims?
ArgumentsthattheSupremacyClauseitselfcreatesacauseofactionmaybolster
argumentsthattheUnitedStatesisanappropriateplaintifftoseekaninjunctionagainst
alegedlypreemptedstateregulation. IftheSupremacyClauseisthesourceofthe
claim, thentheUnitedStatesmaylookmoreliketheproperpartytopursuesuchan
actionagainstthestates. Indeed, theUnitedStatesreliedontheSupremacyClauseas
asourceofitsclaim inArizona v. United States.127
Individualshavesometimescharacterizedtheirsuitstoenjoinallegedlypre-
emptedstatelawsasimpliedintheSupremacyClause, buttheCourtlefttheissue
ofaSupremacy-basedactionopeninitsrecentdecisioninDouglas v. Independent
LivingCenter.128 InDouglas, Medicaidprovidersandrecipientssoughtaninjunction
againstastatestatutethatloweredpaymentstoproviders;theyarguedthatthere-
ductionviolatedaprovisionoftheMedicaidstatutedirectingstateplanstoprovide
payments sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and services are avail-
ableundertheplanatleasttotheextentthatsuchcareandservicesareavailableto
the general population in the geographic area.129 Thestatutealsorequiredstatesto
seekadministrativeapprovalofplanchanges.130
Characterizingtheactionasconstitutionalhadatleasttwopotentialadvantagesfor
theDouglas plaintiffs. (1) Itsuggestedapresumptiveentitlementtoacauseofaction
toenjoinalegedlyilegalgovernmentactionundertheExparte Youngmodel,131 rather
thanrequiringtheplaintiffstoshow congressionalintenttocreateprivaterightsasis
requiredformostimpliedstatutoryactions.132 (2) Relatedly, itdirectedattentionaway
127 Complaint, supra not 104, at ¶¶ 6163.
128 Douglas v. Indep. Living Center, 132 S. Ct. 1204, 121011 (2012).
129 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(30)(A).
130 Douglas, 132 S. Ct. at1208 (indicatingthatcontinuedreceiptoffederalfundsrequired
approvalofplanamendments).
131 See DavidSloss, Constitutional Remedies for Statutory Violations, 89 IOWAL.REV. 355,
36566 (2004) (showing that the Court has not generally required satisfaction of requirements
forimpliedstatutoryactionsincaseswherealitigantchalengesastatelaw onthegroundthat
federallawoccupiesthefieldorthatthestatestandardimposedaconflictingobligation);id. at
362 (arguingforaconstitutionalrightofactiontoenforcestatutorylaw);id. at386 (indicating
thatCongresscouldnegatesuchanaction);StephenI. Vladeck, Douglasand the Fate of Ex
parteYoung, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE, 13, 15 (2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/04/39
/vladeck.html(favoringimpliedsupremacyactions);cf. DustinM. Dow, The Unambiguous
Supremacy Clause, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1009, 103437 (2012) (arguing that the Court should
treatequallycaseswheretheplaintiffallegespreemptionexpresslyandthoseinwhichthey
allegethatastatepolicyviolatesfederallaw);Yackle, supra note86, at130 (arguingforgreater
abilityoftheUnitedStatestobringparens patriae suits, andrelyingonthepresumptiveavail-
abilityofactionstovindicateconstitutionalrights). But cf. MichaelCoenen, Constitutional
Privileging, 99 VA. L. REV. 683, 711 (2013) (givingexampleofimpliedactionsasmanifesting
courts privileging constitutional over statutory claims); id. at743 (arguingthatconstitutional
privilegingoftenrunscountertothecanonofconstitutionalavoidance).
132 Inpriorcases, lowercourtshadfoundnoprivaterightofactionnor§1983 action
undertheMedicaidprovisionatissue. See Douglas, 132 S. Ct. at 121112 (Roberts, C.J.,
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from the remedial scheme provided by the alegedly preempting federal statutein this
case, agencyproceduresforapprovalofplanchanges, withpotentialjudicialreview.133
WhilethemajoritydidnotreachthequestionofwhethertheSupremacyClause
createdacauseofaction, ChiefJusticeRoberts, indissent, sensiblyarguedthatthe
SupremacyClauseisnotasourceofrights, butratherenforcedrightscreatedby
statutes.134 Hisreasoningsuggeststhatpreemptionactionsderivefrom traditional
equityclaimsthatwereavailablewhenallegedultraviresgovernmentactionthreat-
enedtobearoncertainindividualinterests,135 aswellasfrom thefederalstatutethat
theplaintiffsargueshouldbeinterpretedtorenderthestateregulationinoperative.
Thecharacterizationofmostpreemptionactionsasmoretraditional-equity-and
statute-based rather than Supremacy Clausebased, however, is not necessarily deci-
siveastowhetheracauseofactionexistsinparticularcircumstances. Evenunderan
equity-and-statutorycharacterization, individualsmaybeabletobringanticipatory
actions without having to satisfy the normal requisites for implied statutory actions
particularlywithrespectto(althoughnotalwayslimitedto) threatenedenforcement.136
Andevenunderaconstitutionallyimpliedcharacterization, existingalternativere-
medialschemesmaycountagainstrecognizingsuchaninjunctivesuit.137 Indeed, the
majorityanddissentinDouglas moreorlessagreedonthislatterpoint: agencypro-
ceedingsforagencyapprovalofthestateamendmenttoitsplan, andinwhichMedicaid
providerscouldcontestthestatepaymentscheme, suggestedthatthefreestanding
injunctiveclaim inthatcaseshouldnotproceed.138
WhenthefederalgovernmentpurportstobringaSupremacy-basedclaim, the
governmentoftenseekssimilaradvantagesasdoprivateplaintiffs. (1) Characterizing
theactionasconstitutionalsuggeststhatthegovernmentmayrelyoninjunctiveactions
suchasExparte Young, ratherthanonanyexplicitstatutoryauthority;(2) andthe
Supremacycharacterizationdirectsatentionawayfrom thealternativeremediestypi-
caly available for chalenges to preempted statutesactions where the United States
maynotbetheappropriateinitiatingparty.
dissenting) (arguingitmadenosensetoprovideacauseofactiontoproviderstoenforce
theirstatutoryrightswhenthestatuteprovidednosuchrightofaction).
133 Cf. id. at1210.
134 See id. at1213 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing§1983 casesthattreatedpreemption
claims as vindicating rights under the laws rather than the Constitution).
135 See id. at1213 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasizingthatequityactionslikeEx
parte Youngactionsraiseddefensestoenforcementactions).
136 See JohnHarrison, ExparteYoung, 60 STAN.L.REV.989, 99091 (2009) (arguing that
Exparte Younginvolvedatraditionalanti-suitinjunctionclaim thatraisedadefensetoan
enforcementaction);see also supra note27.
137 Cf. Arizonav. InterTribalCouncilofArizona, 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2260 (2013) (directing
thepartiestoacommissionwhenprivatepartieschallengedonpreemptiongroundsstate
voterregistrationforms, whichthestateclaimedithadconstitutionalauthoritytoimplement).
138 132 S. Ct. at 121011; id. at 121112 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the act
vestedintheagencyresponsibilityforenforcementofthefederalconditionsonspending).
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Astopoint(1), asnotedabove, individualscanoftenrelyonExparte Young
actionstoenjoinpreemptedstatelaw, withoutshowingexplicitstatutoryauthorization.
ThefrequentavailabilityofExparte Youngactionsforindividualscontestingstate
regulation, however, doesnotsuggestthatthefederalgovernmentshouldhavesuchan
action.139 TheExparte Youngsuitisameansforindividualstotestgovernmentalpower
thatthreatenstobearonindividuals, notanadditionalmeansforgovernmenttotestits
own powerwhether against other governments or individuals.140 Indeed, theExparte
Youngactionbetweenindividualsandgovernmentofficialsprovidespartoftheoveral
traditionalremedialframeworkthatmakesintergovernmentalsuitssuperfluous.
Itmightbeargued, however, thatfederalgovernmentsuitsservethesamepur-
poseasExparte Youngactionsthatindividualsbringagainstpreemptedregulation:
they help to rein in states unlawful regulation of individuals.141 Butiftherationale
forthegovernmentsupremacysuitisthatitachievesthesameaimsasindividual
suits, thenoneisleftwiththesamequestionthatbedevilsparens patriae suits: Why
notrelyonindividualstovindicatetheirowninterests? And, asnotedabove, treat-
inggovernmentastheproperpartyislikelytounderminetheroleofindividualsin
makingstructuralchallenges.
CONCLUSION
Becausesovereignty-basedsuitsgenerallyareneitherstatutorilyauthorizednor
constitutionallyrequired, thegovernment-plaintiffisaskingthecourttoexercisedis-
cretionaryequitablepowerstorecognizetheaction. Proponentsofsovereignty-based
actions argue that the suits reflect modern federalism, that the governments interests
areseparateandperhapsstrongerthanthoseofindividuals, andthatrecognizingsuch
suitsservesregulatorypurposes. Thereare, however, amplereasonsthecourtsshould
declinetousetheirdiscretiontorecognizesuchactions. Existingremediesaccom-
modatemodernfederalism;thejudicialsystem traditionallyseesprivatepartiesas
havingtheparamountinterestincontestingallegedgovernmentalillegality;andthe
regulatorypurposesofcausesofactionareservedbytraditionalactionsbetween
governmentandindividuals. Inseekingrecognitionofsovereignty-basedactions,
moreover, thegovernment-plaintiffeffectivelyasksthecourtstoextendtheboundaries
ofbothjudicialandexecutivepower, whileunderminingtheroleofindividualsin
challenginggovernmentillegality.
139 But cf. Huq, supra note12, at1440 (arguingagainstmostimpliedactionsforindividuals
astostructuralclaims, andfavoringinstitutionalsuits).
140 But cf. Davis, supra note10, at5 (indicatingthatgovernmentsuitsarenotfoundedon
corrective justice, but manifest an understanding that federal courts may elaborate the
remedialimplicationsoffederallaw inaregulatorymodeinordertoensureaneffective
enforcement system).
141 Cf. id. at 77 (From a federalist perspective, there are clear benefits to permitting the
statestosueinfederalcourtstostopthefederalgovernmentfrom takingunconstitutional
enforcement actions.).
